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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Kaikōura earthquake, with a moment of 
magnitude equivalent to Mw=7.8, occurred two 
minutes after midnight on the 14th of November 2016 
(NZST). The epicenter was about 60km south-west of 
the town of Kaikōura, New Zealand (NZ), while the 
hypocenter was at a depth of approximately 15km. 
The event was a summation of multiple fault ruptures 
over a large spatial domain, and its complexity has 
resulted in the reassessment of many assumptions 
about earthquake processes.  
The transportation network of the entire northeast 
portion of the South Island was badly affected. In this 
area, there are over 268 State Highway (SH) bridge 
structures, most of which are made of reinforced 
concrete, and 636 local road bridge structures 
(Palermo et al., 2017).  
The performance of bridges during major 
earthquakes is of interest for reviewing the 
assumptions that are made during the seismic design 
or assessing the structure and its approaches. 
Therefore, the overall aim of this paper is to present 
general observations for the performance and 
resilience shown by the most severely damaged road 
bridges in the Kaikōura Earthquake, and to open the 
discussion on how to improve seismic resilience of 
road bridges during future events.  
 
The four bridges covered by the present paper are 
located within 5km radius of one another and within 
11km of the township of Waiau, which is the closest 
town to the earthquake epicenter. Except for the 
Wandle River Bridge, which is on a shallow soil site, 
the bridges are situated on sites underlain with deep 
layers of dense gravels and sand, and it is likely that 
they were subjected to similar intensity of ground 
shaking (Wood & McHaffie, 2017). Table 1 shows 
the main general information of the four bridges 
analyzed, together with a map of their location in  
 
Figure 1. 
  
Table 1. Bridges assessed in the present report 
Bridge 
Name 
Year 
of 
design 
Length Number 
of spans 
High-
way 
Distance 
of 
epicenter 
 m   km 
Lottery 
River 
1984 123 6 Inland 
Route 
11 
Lower 
Mason 
River 
1984 164 8 Inland 
Route 
7 
Mason 
River 
1979 197 12 River 
Road 
5 
Wandle 
River 
1987 51 3 Inland 
Route 
13 
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Figure 1. Map of bridges analyzed in the Hurunui District with 
the maximum measured PGA 
2 EARTHQUAKE GROUND MOTIONS 
During the Kaikōura earthquake, there was a large 
spatial variation in the shaking intensity, even within 
the moderate distances within the same district. When 
judging the level of damage to bridges, on top of the 
earthquake intensity, the variation in the design 
philosophy and the seismic detailing need to be taken 
into account as they can dictate either desirable or 
undesirable performance. 
Figure 2 shows the geometric mean (of the two 
horizontal components) of the 5% damped elastic 
horizontal pseudo-spectral accelerations measured in 
Te Mara Farm Waiau station (WTMC), located close 
to Waiau (see  
 
Figure 1). Overlaid are the NZ elastic design 
spectra used during three design eras. The present day 
elastic design spectra was taken from 
NZS1170.5:2004, it was obtained for a Bridge 
Manual Importance Level 2 (1/1000-year annual 
probability of exceedance, ULS) structure, soil class 
C, and having a Hazard factor Z = 0.45, with no near 
fault effects. The two oldest design spectra, based on 
working stress design, were taken from Kaiser et al. 
(2017), and modified for compatibility with limit 
state design by Palermo et al (2017).  
The bridges studied were designed in the period 
ranging from 1980 to 1987, hence, using the design 
spectra from the 1965-1987 era. The corresponding 
design spectra was greatly exceeded, as it can be seen 
in Figure 2. Most bridges had elastic periods of 
vibration within the range of 0.2 s to 1.0s, which is 
the period of vibration where the ground shaking at 
WTMC exceeded even the modern design spectra 
(Figure 2). The bridges had a transverse period of 
vibration in the range of 0.2s to 0.6s and the pseudo-
spectral acceleration experienced by these bridges 
greatly exceeded 1.5g.  
Figure 2. Geometric mean of the pseudo-spectral acceleration 
measured at WTMC strong motion station (Palermo et al., 
2017) 
3 STRUCTURAL PERFORMANCE AND 
DAMAGE 
3.1 Structural configuration of the bridges 
The Lottery River, Lower Mason River, Mason 
River, and Wandle River bridges (Figure 3) are 
structurally similar to one another. They are all multi-
span precast concrete bridges supported on single 
column piers with hammer head pier caps. Further 
structural details are summarized in  
Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Main structural details and main damage summary for 
the four bridges under study (Wood & McHaffie, 2017) 
Bridge 
Name 
Superstructure 
Pier 
type 
Pier 
founda-
tion 
Main damage 
Lottery 
River 
Continuous RC 
deck, joint at 
middle pier, twin 
20m prestressed I 
beams 
Single 
column 
Single  
cylinder 
Severe hinging 
in columns & 
buckling of 
column rebar 
Lower 
Mason 
River 
Continuous RC 
deck, joint at 
middle pier, twin 
20m prestressed I 
beams 
Single 
column 
Single  
cylinder 
Severe hinging 
in columns & 
fracture/buckli
ng of column 
rebar 
Mason 
River  
Five 16m 
pretensioned 
double core deck 
units 
Single 
column 
Steel H 
pile 
group 
Hinging in 
columns, 
superstructure 
joint damage 
Wandle 
River 
Five 16m 
pretensioned 
double core deck 
units 
Single 
column 
Single  
cylinder 
Severe hinging 
in columns - 
Bridge 
demolished  
 
In the way they resist lateral loading, the Lottery 
River (Figure 3a) and Lower Mason (Figure 3b) 
bridges are identical. The transverse interaction has 
been isolated by the omission of transverse shear keys 
at the central pier (Palermo et al., 2017). In addition, 
they use a rudimentary form of seismic isolation 
under transverse loading such that they can displace 
an appreciable amount on the supporting elastomeric 
bearings before contacting the shear keys. As a result, 
the bridges make use of the low lateral stiffness of the 
bearings to elongate the period of the structure.  
Figure 3. Bridges under study: (a) Lottery River Bridge; (b) 
Lower Mason River Bridge; (c) Mason River Bridge; (d) 
Wandle River Bridge (Palermo et al., 2017). 
 
The longitudinal interaction between each half of 
the bridge has been isolated by a movement joint with 
knock off detail. The deck beams are tied together 
longitudinally except over the central pier. The beams 
rest on wide seats, thus, all piers resist longitudinal 
lateral loading, except the central pier, which is 
effectively much more flexible. Until the beams 
contact the shear keys, the overall transverse response 
can be thought of as rigid body translation of each half 
of the superstructure. 
Similarly, the Mason River Bridge (Figure 3c) is 
split in two with a central movement joint. There are 
transverse shear keys at the abutments and internal 
longitudinal shear keys and linkage bars over all of 
the piers except the central pier. At the central pier, 
provision is made for longitudinal movement with 
loose linkage bars but steel plate lateral support stubs 
cast into the piers restrain the transverse movement. 
Therefore, the overall transverse response can be 
thought of as the deck having a curved displaced 
shape where the largest transverse displacement 
occurs at the central pier (Palermo et al., 2017).  
The Wandle River Bridge (Figure 3d) is curved in 
plan and has a slope in the longitudinal direction. 
Linkages, shear keys and elastomeric bearings 
restrain the transverse and longitudinal movement 
over the piers, but only linkage bars resist both the 
transverse and longitudinal movement at the 
abutments. Longitudinal movement towards the 
backfill at the abutments is resisted by the abutment 
back-wall which is cast against the beams. 
3.2 Bridge performance and observed damage 
At the Lower Mason Bridge, all piers, except for 
the central, formed fully developed plastic hinges 
(PH) at the base. As mentioned, the central pier is 
located below a movement joint in the deck and has 
shear keys restraining the superstructure. Extensive 
cover spalling and a significant number of buckled 
and fractured longitudinal bars were seen. Pier 
damage at the Lottery River Bridge was similar but 
without an evidence of bar fracture. Figure 4 
illustrates the damage patterns found on the column 
rebar of both bridges.  
Figure 4. Pier damage sustained by Lower Mason River Bridge 
(top) and Lottery River Bridge (bottom).  
 Together with the PH zones, observed damage 
common to both bridges, Lower Mason and Lottery, 
included: damage to the knock-off block at the central 
pier movement joint, failure of the abutment knock-
off blocks; residual displacement of most of the 
elastomeric bearing pads at the piers and abutments; 
and residual displacements at the central pier and 
abutment movement joints. Damage to the abutments 
is illustrated in Figure 5.  
Figure 5. Abutment damage schematics for the Lower Mason 
River Bridge (modified from: Palermo et al, 2017) 
 
Similar damage observations were made for the 
Mason River Bridge, where the deck joints had 
opened or closed, and pier PH with bar buckling and 
concrete spalling were observed with increasing 
degree of damage towards the central pier. The pier 
damage pattern was interesting at this bridge as 
concrete spalling and rebar exposure occurred mainly 
at the face of the piers facing south, and tended to be 
more in the longitudinal loading direction. 
The damage observed to the Wandle River Bridge 
was extensive, and included: separation between the 
hollow core deck units at the south end of the bridge; 
translation of deck units in the downstream direction; 
hinging and rotating of piers towards the upstream 
side (up to 7° rotation); opening of the deck joints at 
the abutments, along with significant approach 
damage (Figure 6).  
Figure 6. Damage schematics for the Wandle River Bridge 
(modified from: Palermo et al., 2017) 
 
The displacement capacities for the bridges were 
estimated by Wood & McHaffie (2017) using a 
tributary mass type Displacement Based Design 
(DBD) analysis of a single pier, at the Damage 
Control Limit State (DCLS). They are compared in 
Table 3 with the displacement demand for transverse 
direction loading estimated from spectra computed 
from the WMTC records.  
 
Table 3. Displacement capacity and WMTC demand 
Bridge 
Name 
DCLS 
Capacity 
Demand 
from 
WMTC 
Records 
Ratio  
Capacity/ 
Demand 
Secant 
Period at 
WMTC 
Demand 
mm mm  s 
Lottery 
River 
130 300 0.43 2.1 
Lower 
Mason 
River 
160 290 0.55 2.2 
Mason 
River 
180 130 1.38 1.1 
Wandle 
River 
180 350 0.51 1.8 
 
Based on the assumption that the WMTC records 
are a reasonable representation of the bridge site 
ground motions, the displacement demands on the 
bridges were considerably greater than the DCLS 
capacity displacements, explaining the severe 
damage observed in the PH zones.  
It can be concluded that the piers performed well, 
as they developed PH at the pier bases and went 
through the expected failure mechanism. However, 
significant instability was visible in the Wandle 
Bridge, where most likely all orthogonal motions 
were interacting with the bridge structure, causing 
large displacements and separation gaps between 
some of the deck beam units.  
4 RECOVERY PROCESS  
After the earthquake, the priority was to restore 
access to Kaikōura Township and surroundings, 
which were cut off by earthquake damage, and 
establish a safe and reliable alternative route. To 
achieve this, the Inland Route, via Waiau, was 
identified as the best option since the main route, 
through SH1, was completely blocked due to 
landslides.  
It took 38 days after the earthquake to reopen the 
Inland Route. This was mainly due to earthquake 
induced damage on the road such as significant rock 
fall and slips that needed to be cleared, in addition to 
the associated construction activity which also 
contributed to the hazard. The bridges were able to be 
reopened, to some level of service, within a few days. 
However, it took up to three months to complete their 
repairs. It is important to highlight that repairs to the 
bridges so far are considered temporary in some 
extent and permanent restoration of the bridges is to 
be planned 
In general terms, the bridge structures withstood 
the earthquake sequence well, demonstrating 
considerably robustness. However, many bridge 
approaches were damaged due to settlement and 
horizontal movement, thereby making some bridges 
impassable. Approach reconstruction through the 
placement of fill and resealing quickly made the 
majority of these road bridges usable again.  
 Figure 7 illustrates the recovery rate of the Inland 
Route and the bridges under study during the first one 
hundred days following the earthquake using the 
maximum speed allowance as a functionality 
indicator for normal, Class 1, vehicles. The 
earthquake occurred at 12:02 am on the 14th of 
November, causing the Inland Route to be 
immediately closed by the Civil Defense Emergency 
Management. The route remained closed until it was 
given access for the NZ Defense Force convoys to get 
through with emergency supplies to Kaikōura, on 
November 25th, 12 days after the earthquake (point A 
in Figure 7).  
Figure 7. Functionality based on the maximum speed limit for 
the Inland Route and the four bridges under study.  
 
The route remained fragile and hazardous, closed 
to the general public until the 6th of December, day 23 
after the earthquake (point B in Figure 7), when 
controlled emergency and resident access was 
allowed with a speed limitation of 30km/h, 70% less 
than the pre-earthquake speed limit of 100km/h. 
Works undertaken during these days to make the 
severely damaged road safe enough included clearing 
the road of more than fifty slips, stabilizing slopes, 
and assessing the damage to the bridges.  
It was only until the 21st (point C in Figure 7) of 
December when the public were granted unrestricted 
access to the Inland Road, bringing the first 
unrestricted road connection back to Kaikōura, for a 
total recovery time TRE of 38 days after the 
earthquake. 
The Lower Mason River Bridge was opened to 
traffic on November 17th, day 4 after the earthquake, 
(point 1 on the graph) with a speed restriction of 
30km/h and a sign “one heavy vehicle at a time”. 
Overweight vehicles were to use the adjacent ford 
that was installed on the day after the earthquake. 
Prior to opening the bridge, the following works had 
been completed: detailed inspection of the bridge, 
removal and appropriate filling of the knock off 
device at the central expansion joint, and approach 
repairs and re-levelling. To reinstate the original 
seismic capacity, a pile jacketing was issued for all 
pier columns, which was finished around mid-
January (point 2 in Figure 7). After the pile jacketing 
was completed, the one-heavy-vehicle-at-a-time 
restriction was removed but the 30km/h restriction 
remained due to the uneven road surface.  
The recovery process for the Lottery Bridge was 
very similar to the Lower Mason, since they share 
similar structure type and damage. Pier columns were 
unable to be inspected on the first days after the 
earthquake due to the bed and water level, yet, 
damage was anticipated to be less than at Lower 
Mason due to the shorter bridge columns. Excavation 
of pier piles occurred on November 25th confirming 
that damage was of a lesser extent, and pier jacketing 
was issued and completed around mid-February 
(point 3 in Figure 7).  
Likewise, the Mason River Bridge shared the same 
timeline, however no security works have been 
carried out on this bridge as the earthquake damage 
was considered not to affect the serviceability of the 
structure. Investigation is currently underway to 
expose bridge piers and replace buckled bars.  
For the Wandle River Bridge, decision was made 
on November 15th to install a Bailey bridge upstream 
with a 33m span. Installation was completed by 
November 21st and opened to traffic on the 22nd, nine 
days after the earthquake (point 4 in Figure 7). The 
Bailey bridge was able to be erected so quickly, 
within eight days, because New Zealand Transport 
Agency (NZTA) maintains an emergency stock of 
Bailey bridges with a contractor also in place to 
respond in the event of emergencies. The Bailey 
bridge provided largely unrestricted access across the 
Wandle River, however, a 30km/h speed restriction 
was installed due to the alignment and to provide 
impact protection to the bridge. The Wandle Bridge 
was demolished in May 2017 and a new bridge design 
is programmed with a low priority for 2018. 
Permanent recovery works on the bridges have 
been given a low priority. The initial response works 
intended to restore an acceptable level of service for 
the Inland Route that would enable access into and 
out of Kaikōura following the November earthquake. 
Once this was achieved, the priority of works was 
switched to recovering SH1. There is also reluctance 
to undertake further significant work on the Inland 
Route, as this route acts as a bypass to SH1 to access 
Kaikōura from the south. 
It is important to note that while the route may 
have been at open, pre-earthquake speed limits of 
100km/h, heavy vehicles would still have to comply 
with lower speed requirements. Additionally, all 
bridges are single lane, therefore, it is unlikely that 
even normal vehicles were travelling across the 
bridges at maximum speed. 
5 HOW TO PREDICT STRUCTURAL 
RESILIENCE? 
The NZ South Island transportation network had a 
resilient response, as it counted with alternative 
routes connecting locations, allowing to restore 
access to isolated communities within a relatively 
reasonable time. On the other hand, access to 
Kaikōura was closed during the first 23 days for the 
general public, what makes us wonder, resilience for 
whom? 
Furthermore, in terms of bridge performance, the 
bridge structures withstood the earthquake sequence 
well. Bridges demonstrated considerably robustness 
and hence resilience as, even if damaged, they 
allowed the transit of vehicles and therefore to 
reinstate functionality in the route. But, as they are 
still awaiting for permanent repairs to be undertaken, 
what is the current damage resistance capacity or 
probability of failure? Can we expect them to show 
resilience for future events? What leads us to the 
question, how can we assess and predict structural 
resilience? 
5.1 Resilience assessment 
In studies dealing with seismic hazard, resilience 
can be considered as a performance indicator that 
quantifies the residual functionality along with the 
effort in responding to the seismic event (Deco et al, 
2013). In this conceptual approach, performance can 
range between 0 and 100%. In case of an earthquake, 
usually serviceability of a structure drops to a lower 
level, being 0% a complete loss of service, followed 
by a recovery process after the disaster, and then 
finishes when there is a restoration of the 
serviceability to its “normal” performance level. This 
characterization of system performance leads to a 
broader conceptualization of resilience, where a 
resilient structure can be understood as one with the 
ability to present reduced chances of failure, reduced 
consequences from failures and reduced recovery 
time (Bruneau et al, 2003).  
Within the Technical Guidance for Engineering 
Assessments (2017) in NZ, structural resilience is 
defined as the ability of the structure to continue to 
perform in earthquake shaking beyond an Ultimate 
Limit State (ULS) shaking demand level. Therefore, 
the bigger the space between the point of onset of 
nonlinear behavior and the point of brittle behavior of 
the structure, which would lead to collapse, the more 
resilient is a structure. Structural resilience can be 
thought as an inherent characteristic of structures 
designed to the new codes or even older well designed 
structures, as their performance will follow the 
desirable hierarchy of element failures, which was the 
case of the bridges under study. There can be the case 
where a structural system has a low resilience and is 
susceptible to sudden reduction in their performance 
and functionality as the earthquake shaking increases 
beyond a particular value.  
Measuring resilience has been an exploding field 
of inquiry in the past decade. Disaster resilience 
assessment approaches fall into three primary 
categories: indicators, scorecards, and tools (Cutter, 
2015). In the following section the assessment of 
resilience through the use of indicators will be further 
discussed.  
5.2 Resilience indicators for road bridges 
Indicators are quantifiable variables that represent 
selected characteristics of resilience (Cutter, 2015). 
Generally, individual indicators can be combined to 
create a resilience index (Kammouh et al. 2017b). 
The index illustrates multi-dimensional nature of 
resilience by aggregating multiple indicators, but also 
condenses its complexity into a single numeric value.  
Recent bridge design codes consider performance 
uncertainty by including specific factors in the 
computation of structural resistance and load. 
However, this does not comply the uncertainties in 
loading and deterioration processes which make the 
prediction of lifecycle performance of bridges so 
complex. Prediction of time-dependent bridge 
performance under uncertainty may require the use of 
several indicators, thus, it is important to select 
adequate indicators to evaluate and predict the 
structural performance and functionality of bridges.  
Significant research has been done on quantifying 
structural performance with deterministic and 
probabilistic indicators (Frangopol & Saydam, 2014). 
For example, system reliability measures, such as the 
probability of failure or the reliability index, are 
adequate for quantifying the safety of a structure with 
respect to ultimate limit states, but the system 
redundancy index is required to evaluate the avail-
ability of warning before a system’s failure 
(Frangopol & Saydam, 2014). Additionally, 
performance indicators related to damage tolerance of 
structures, such as vulnerability and robustness are 
essential to consider for bridges under deterioration 
together with the indicators related to system safety.  
Subsequently, it is required to consider multiple 
indicators when evaluating the seismic resilience of a 
bridge. Indicators must be weighted according to their 
contribution towards the resilience of the system, so 
that resilience is quantified as a normalized value of 
the area inside the enclosed shape made by linking the 
adjacent indicators weights or scores. Kammouh et al. 
(2017a) introduced and exemplified three weighting 
methods for resilience indicators based either on the 
dependence tree analysis or on the spider plot analysis 
(Kammouh et al. 2017a, Kammouh et al., in press). 
Table 4 shows some examples of resilience 
indicators for bridges. They have been divided into 
two categories, ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ indicators, according 
to the difficulty involved in their measurement. Soft 
indicators, in general, can be determined qualitatively 
through surveys, data compilation or specific sample 
procedures, whereas hard indicators would require a 
higher effort, whichever computational, numerical or 
probabilistic. They can be calculated using 
mathematical formulas and/or matrices in order to 
approximate and understand the characteristic of the 
system under study.  
 
Table 4. Examples of 'soft' and 'hard' type of resilience indicators 
for bridges 
Soft Indicators Hard Indicators 
Speed Limit Safety factor 
Travel time  Reliability index 
Physical access Probability of failure 
Weight allowance Redundancy index 
Operative utility systems  Vulnerability 
Condition Ratings Robustness 
 
Indicators can be measured at a member or a 
component level, an overall structure or a system 
level, and a group of structures or a network level. For 
example, when evaluating stability problems, the 
performance is normally quantified at a member 
level, and normally, this is enough to ensure an 
adequate level of safety. However, when evaluating 
resilience, a member level approach might not 
provide the necessary information about the overall 
performance of the bridge or the bridge network. 
6 LESSONS LEARNED  
Since all bridges were subjected to similar ground 
motions, it is informative to compare the damage to 
them and the design features that influenced their 
structural performance and resilience. The following 
sections summarize the main issues raised and lessons 
learned from study of these bridges.  
6.1 Bridge intervention and route recovery 
An acceptable level of service was able to be 
restored within a short period of time. This can be 
attributed to a combination of a number of factors: 
• Both NZTA and the Hurunui District Council, 
entities in charge of the bridges, had a Bridge 
Consultant (Opus International Consultants) in 
place to respond in the event of an emergency.  
• The Bridge Consultant was familiar with the 
affected bridge stock and had information readily 
available through an established and maintained 
Bridge Information System. 
• Network contractors (Downer and Sicon) were in 
place to respond in the event of an emergency. 
• Emergency procedures in place to coordinate a 
response, inspections and works. 
• Emergency bridge stock and contractor in place to 
erect Wandle Bailey Bridge. 
• Clients, Consultant and Contractors experienced 
from Canterbury Earthquake Sequence on 2010-
2011.  
• Very knowledgeable client able to make informed 
decisions. 
6.2 Bridge response and behavior 
In modern design, there is a tendency to design 
more efficient structures, with longer spans and 
reduced foundations with a reliance on acceptable 
damage and dissipation through the use of PH. While 
this was largely observed on the bridges on the Inland 
Route, a few things that eventuated were undesirable 
such as the buckling and the fracture of the 
reinforcement and the large residual deformations for 
Wandle Bridge. 
In this event, older bridges that had not been 
designed to modern standards performed better than 
expected. The likely reason for this is that these 
structures were designed with a greater level of 
redundancy, thanks to their shorter spans, more piers 
and more piles for the foundations. 
For the Inland Route around the Waiau area, the 
earthquake demands from the Kaikōura Earthquake 
were severe, in excess of a 1000 year return period. 
As such, it is considered a significant earthquake with 
a low probability of occurring in the bridges’ typical 
design life. On more critical routes, such as SH1, the 
design philosophy tends to shift towards designing to 
meet higher importance levels. For bridges on critical 
routes, the design would typically be for a return 
period of 2500 years at the DCLS and a return period 
in the order of 10 000 years at the Collapse Limit 
State.  
6.3 Reparability and influence of the structural 
form 
The structural scheme can play a part in the repair 
strategy, costs and hence resilience. In the case of 
monolithic bridges, repair of PH should be considered 
at the design stage. On the Lottery and Lower Mason 
bridges, the 1.5m diameter cylinder foundations 
located directly beneath the 1.0m diameter columns 
of the piers simplified the repair (Figure 8a). New 
reinforcement could be doweled into the existing pile 
and the pier re-cast, restoring the moment capacity of 
the column (Figure 8b). In contrast, for the Mason 
Bridge, repair is more difficult due to the shape and 
size of the pier cap (Figure 8c), as the geometry will 
make it very difficult to dowel in additional bars in 
and re-cast concrete. The result will be a significant 
repair cost and potential downtime for the structure.   
Designing and detailing monolithic connections 
taking into account the repair strategy for different 
design level events would optimize the recovery after 
an earthquake event. Furthermore, if the bridges were 
designed for damage avoidance, incorporating energy 
dissipation and reparability, performance and 
recovery of the bridges could be improved. Hence, 
full restoration on the functionality of the route could 
be accomplished immediately after the earthquake.  
Figure 8. Plastic hinge repair: (a) PH in Lower Mason Bridge; 
(b) repair of PH by epoxy grout bars; (c) geometry at Mason 
River Bridge PH zones.   
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Resilience indicators for bridges are important 
tools for predicting and evaluating the structural 
performance and functionality of bridges given a 
seismic event. They can help to characterize the basic 
elements of the structure under analysis and thus help 
to raise the awareness on the benefits of mitigation 
technologies and strategies, and making the business 
case for understanding the investments and results of 
enhancing resilience at different scales. This paper 
provides a general conceptualization of resilience 
indicators as a starting point for future research to be 
undertaken on the prediction of structural 
performance and resilience of bridges.  
A brief overview of the structural performance and 
resilience shown by the most severely damaged 
bridges during the Kaikōura Earthquake has been 
given. At the time of initial inspection, the bridges 
were rapidly assessed and were generally only open 
to emergency traffic. Since then, temporary repair 
works allowed public access through these routes; 
however, long term repair or replacement strategies 
are still being considered by the managing authorities. 
From the perspective of life safety we can consider 
the overall performance as satisfactory.  
The bridges, even if damaged, behaved as 
expected from design and allowed to reinstate transit 
of vehicles and restore the functionality in the route. 
This made possible to restore access to isolated 
communities within a relatively reasonable time of 23 
days, thanks to the availability of an alternative route 
which has worked as a bypass. However, was this a 
satisfactory performance in a seismically active 
developed country or do we need to improve our 
current design philosophy so that we can warrant 
enhanced resilience during future events? 
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